E.G.

Over at The Bellman, Zwichenzug has a good post responding to my abortion argument.  Here are some thoughts.

1. I agree with Z.’s suggestion that, in the case of Anna (discussed here), more would need to be known about Anna’s precise circumstances in order to assess her obligations. 

In order for the case of Anna to be useful for my argument, here is what is needed: (a) By slamming on the brakes, Anna takes on a set of risks which are at least as bad as those accompanying pregnancy; (b) Anna is at least as uncertain about whether the dark mass is a person as we are about whether the fetus is a person; (c) Our reaction to Anna’s case, given it satisfies (a) and (b), is to say that Anna ought to slam on the brakes.

To make Anna’s case satisfy (a) and (b), further work is needed.  Google will be useful for (a) .  Satisfying (b) will probably be trickier.  I won’t do that work here.  Instead, I’ll just proceed on the assumption that an Anna-style case can be constructed where (a) and (b) are satisfied and (c) still holds. 

2.  A more interesting question is whether, even if (a), (b) and (c) are satisfied, the case of Anna is relevantly similar to the case of abortion.  Z. introduces a distinction which is useful in trying to answer this question.

"Things will go easier [Z. writes] if we have names for each arm of the distinction [between the sort of uncertainty we find ourselves in when we ask whether a fetus is a person, and the sort of uncertainty Anna finds herself in when she asks whether the dark mass is a person], so let’s say that Anna is in a condition of empirical uncertainty while our uncertainty regarding the fetus is conceptual uncertainty. Though he provides no argument on the point, David is committed to the claim that these two kinds of uncertainty have identical implications for moral reasoning."

Z. is absolutely right that I am committed to that result.  But (predictably) I don’t find the result problematic. 

We have a set of obligations to those things which are called "persons."  Whether our actions fulfill those obligations depends (in part, and in the right circumstances) on whether the things in our vicinity are persons.  If I know that, by action A, I will destroy thing y, then whether doing A violates any obligations should depend (in part, and in the right circumstances) on whether y is a person.  If I am uncertain whether y is a person, I am uncertain whether doing A will violate my obligations.  I don’t see how it makes a difference whether my uncertainty is conceptual or empirical.  As I see it, the important thing, from a moral point of view, is that I am uncertain, for whatever reason, whether y is a person, and therefore uncertain whether A violates obligations of mine.

Z. points out two differences between empirical and conceptual uncertainty: 1. "Further investigation" can resolve empirical uncertainty, whereas it is at least possible that no further investigation will resolve conceptual uncertainty; 2. Conceptual questions are "prior," in a certain way, to empirical questions (in the sense that "conceptual uncertainty has to do with questions about ontology, whereas empirical uncertainty takes ontology as given").  After listing these differences, Z. says:

"More could be said, but the above is enough, I think, to show that equivocating between the two sorts of uncertainty is problematic. As such, it seems unlikely that cases like the one given can legitimately influence our judgments of the moral status of abortion."

I am probably being dense, but I just don’t see how these two differences problematize my commitment to treating conceptual and empirical uncertainty the same way for moral purposes.  I’d welcome Z.’s (or others’) help here.

3. Finally, Z. raises a problem which has been troubling me as well: The "precautionary principle" I’ve advocated may have deeply implausible consequences in other domains. 

Let’s say a "borderline person" is a thing whose personhood is conceptually uncertain.  The precautionary principle would have us treat borderline persons with a great deal of caution; it would advise us, for instance, to make non-negligible sacrifices in order to avoid destroying or otherwise harming them.  Are there cases where this is just not an acceptable policy?  It has already been pointed out, by Z. as well as in comments here (by Richard, I believe), that the precautionary principle might commit us to vegetarianism or other inconvenient policies with regard to animals.  This commitment would sadden me (I like hamburgers) but it does not seem (to me) absurd.  But are there any other commitments entailed by the precautionary principle which are intolerable?  Is the precautionary principle too demanding?  I’d like to hear your thoughts on this in comments.