E.G.

My opinion is that we should be faithful vegans: We should consistently and constantly follow veganism's rules.

On an alternative view, we should be economic half-vegans. An economic half-vegan is someone who follows this rule:

The economic rule: Avoid decisions that send the sorts of economic signals that cause producers to do bad things to animals. Feel free to make decisions that do not send such signals, even when such decisions violate veganism's rules.

The economic rule, I grant, gets some things right. For example, purchasing chicken sandwiches from McDonald's sends economic signals that cause farmers to do horrible things to chickens. So, the economic rule forbids purchasing chicken sandwiches from McDonald's.

But this rule permits many choices that faithful vegans won't make. Consider bivalves. Buying oysters sends economic signals to oyster farmers that cause them to raise oysters in order kill and sell them. But if (i) oysters aren't conscious, and therefore (ii) it isn't bad for farmers to raise oysters in order to kill and sell them—then it seems that the economic rule permits us to buy oysters.

My view, by contrast, is that even if (i) and (ii) are both true and known to be true, we still should not buy oysters—because buying oysters is inconsistent with being a faithful vegan.

In what follows I will discuss one of main deficiencies of the economic rule. My discussion here won't get us all the way to a case for fully faithful veganism. But it will, I think, provide good reason to reject economic half-veganism.

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Imagine: Company X owns a large factory where thousands of people are employed. There is an open shop union that has been founded to represent the employees of the factory. From time to time, the union calls a strike, or threatens to do so, in the course of negotiations over matters like wage increases, working conditions, etc.

The union's ability to call strikes might give it some power in negotiations with Company X, but the magnitude of this power depends on two factors.

First, the union's power depends on the number of members of the union. If only a tiny fraction of factory employees are members, then factory operations might not be much affected by a strike. And in that case, any strike threat would be unlikely to compel Company X to agree to the union's demands.

Second, the union's power depends on the faithfulness of the members. Suppose that the members have little loyalty to the union, and therefore are willing to cross the picket lines whenever they think doing so is in their self-interest. In that case, even if every last employee of the factory were an official member of the union, strike threats might have little effect on Company X's decisions.

These points highlight an important general point about unions. A union is in the business of making two sorts of demands: Upward demands which are directed at the employer (e.g., a demand to increase wages) and downward demands which are directed at employees who are union members (e.g., a demand to stay home when a strike is called). And these two categories of demands are interlinked. The union cannot effectively make demands of the employer unless it can show the employer that it can effectively make demands of the employees.

The upshot is straightforward. Every time the union calls a strike and then you cross the picket line, you contribute to the erosion of the union's negotiating power. And every time the union calls a strike and then you dutifully stay home, you make the union stronger. So, if you have reason to strengthen rather than weaken the union, then you have reason to (a) join the union and (b) faithfully do what the union tells you to do.

Notice that this reason for compliance with the union's demands may exist even if, in a given instance, you correctly believe that calling a strike was the wrong choice. Even when the strike shouldn't have been called in the first place, it remains true that faithful compliance with the call strengthens the union, and crossing the picket line undermines the union's power.

This means that if the union is broadly good, such that you have reason to make the union more powerful rather than less so, then you have reason to stay home when a strike is called, even when the strike shouldn't have been called.

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Veganism is like a labor union. The differences are:

(1) Veganism is an organization that represents (a certain class of) consumers, whereas a union is an organization that represents employees.

(2) Veganism makes upward demands of producers who sell products to consumers, whereas a union makes upward demands of an employer who buys work from employees.

(3) The demands that veganism makes of producers are concerned with the interests and rights of animals, who are not among the consumers that veganism represents. By contrast, the demands that a union makes of the employer are concerned with the employees represented by the union. Veganism is thus other-directed in a way that labor unions aren't.

(4) Veganism has less structure than a typical union. A typical union has committees, and elections, and so on; and when a decision is made (e.g., a decision to strike) this is usually the result of some sort of formal decision-making process. By contrast, there are no elected leaders of veganism. And there is no committee that determines what the rules of veganism are. (Despite the lack of formal process, however, there is a perhaps surprising degree of consensus among vegans about what veganism permits and what it forbids.)

Despite these differences, the similarities between veganism and labor unions are significant.

Veganism says to producers: We will not buy your products, unless you produce them in accordance with our rules. A union says to an employer: We will not sell our work to you, unless you meet our demands (for improved wages, better working conditions, what-have-you).

Vegans are, in a certain way, on strike against producers who exploit animals in their production processes. And just as an employer will (in ideal circumstances) know what they need to do in order to get the strike to end, so producers will (again, in ideal circumstances) know what they need to do in order to get vegans to be willing to buy their products.

The power of veganism to influence producers is affected by the same two factors that affect the power of a union to influence an employer. First, numbers: The more vegans there are, the more motivated producers will be to meet vegans' demands. And second, faithfulness: The more faithfully vegans abide by veganism's downward demands (i.e., the rules of veganism), the more power the vegan movement will have to influence producer behavior.

To briefly expand on the second of those two points: Imagine a world where 99% of consumers identify as vegan but 99% of those who identify as vegan routinely purchase animal products. Then producers would have little reason to alter their behavior in order to meet veganism's demands. This is like the case where most employees are union members but most union members are strike-breakers. 

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Just as you may have reason to comply with your union's call to strike even in some cases where you know that the union's decision to strike was a mistake, so you may have reason to comply with veganism's rules even in some cases where you know that this or that rule is a mistake.

To make this point, return to the case of bivalves that I discussed at the outset of this post. Suppose (i) and (ii) above are both true, and suppose that, consequently, veganism ought to permit the purchase and consumption of oyster-containing products. That is, an ideal veganism (e.g., a veganism whose rules were written by a committee of maximally wise philosophers) would make an explicit exception for oysters.

Even supposing all that, it remains the case that, as a matter of fact, in the actual world, veganism doesn't permit the purchase and consumption of oyster-containing products. (Oysters are animals and veganism forbids the purchase and consumption of animal products.) And in general, when you show producers that you are willing to buy their products even when their products aren't vegan, you undermine rather than strengthen the power of veganism to make demands of producers. So, there's reason to avoid oyster-containing products even in the case where an ideal veganism would allow oyster-containing products.

And here we come to the problem, as I see it, with economic half-veganism. Economic half-veganism misses the fact that flouting veganism's rules undermines veganism's power to make demands of producers. And it does this even when flouting veganism's rules in a given instance doesn't send the sorts of economic signals that cause producers to do bad things to animals (as may well be the case with oysters).

Economic half-veganism is insufficiently attentive to the importance of contributing to rather than undermining veganism's bargaining power with producers, and should be rejected for that reason.

This, however, doesn't yet mean that we should be fully faithful vegans. Consider the matter of secretly eating leftover turkey sandwiches that would otherwise be thrown away. A fully faithful vegan wouldn't do that. But there's no reason to think that secretly eating those sandwiches would have any chance of undermining veganism's bargaining power with producers. (Eating those sandwiches would be analogous with crossing a picket line in a way that would somehow be undetectable to your employer.) So, the present point about collective bargaining, on its own, doesn't quite show that we should be fully faithful vegans. But it does, I think, show that we should be more faithful than economic half-veganism would have us be.