E.G.

Some people say that there is no such thing as desert. They say that bad people do not deserve to suffer, and that good people do not deserve to be rewarded.

One way to reach such a view is via skepticism about freedom. If you think that (a) we deserve X only if we deserve X in virtue of some free choices that we have made, and that (b) no one ever freely chooses to do anything—then you should think that there is no such thing as desert.

But I'll deny (b).

And it seems clear to me that desert exists. I feel sure that do-gooders deserve to be rewarded for their good deeds. And when I think about people who have done awful things—say, sadistic torturers, and serial killers, etc.—I want to say that they deserve to suffer.

However, although I think desert is real, I also think that desert is morally inert. Desert doesn't do anything, morally speaking. Desert, in my opinion, is morally epiphenomenal.

***

Here is an argument to consider:

(1) Only facts about interests provide moral reasons.
(2) Desert facts aren't facts about interests.
Therefore, desert facts do not provide moral reasons.

A fact about interests is a fact about how some agent's available options bear on someone's well-being. For example, the fact that pushing the large man into the way of the trolley would lethally harm him is a fact about interests.

A desert fact is a fact about what someone deserves. For example, if some particular serial killer deserves to suffer, the fact that they deserve this is a desert fact. 

If the above argument goes through, this would go some distance toward establishing that desert is morally inert. But it wouldn't be enough to fully establish that, because provision of moral reasons is only one of the moral things that something like desert could conceivably do.

Still, I think the argument is interesting. I will explain why I like each of the premises.

***

I assume that (1) will look good to utilitarians. But that's not why I like (1). I am not a utilitarian. Rather, I like (1) because it provides insulation against a certain kind of moral pointlessness.

Consider a case where you have two options, O1 and O2. Assume that, in this case, if you choose O1, no one will be made any better off, or any worse off, than they'd be if you choose O2. It seems to me that this case description, thin as it is, is already enough to establish that you have no moral reason to choose O1 rather than O2, and likewise have no moral reason to choose O2 rather than O1. Any such reason would be pointless in a certain way. And morality, I think, is not pointless in that way.

If (1) is true, then it elegantly explains why, in the case I've just described, you've got no moral reason to choose either option rather than the other. This is one of the reasons why I like (1).

Broadly, it seems to me that there is some deep way in which morality is about well-being: In our capacity as moral creatures, our business is to help one another to pursue and attain good lives. I think (1) is the best way to capture this appealing thought.

***

I am not a hedonist about well-being. I do not have a theory of well-being. But if I were a hedonist about well-being, I would feel completely sure of (2). Surely, the magnitude of someone's pleasure or pain cannot be affected by facts concerning what they do or do not deserve.

True, it may be that a bowl of delicious soup is even more delicious if you believe it to be a deserved reward for a hard day's work. And it may be that suffering is usually less intense, or more bearable, if you think you deserve it, than if you think you do not. So, facts about what we believe we deserve might bear in some important way on the pleasurableness or painfulness of our experiences. But facts about what we believe we deserve are distinct from facts about we do in fact deserve.

Since I don't have a theory of well-being, I can't feel completely sure of (2). But (2) seems plausible to me and I do not know of any good reasons to deny (2). 

Some people say that desert is a component of well-being, such that getting what you deserve, in and of itself, makes some positive contribution to your well-being. Such people may say that if a person who has committed horrible crimes deserves to be severely punished, then their being punished will positively contribute to their well-being; and if they evade punishment, this will make them worse off. This view strikes me as absurd. There are subtler versions of this view that aren't so absurd, but I don't know of any version of this view that is plausible.