E.G.

In this post, I won’t really answer any of the insightful objections that have been raised against my "Stolen Photo" argument.  I’m writing this post in order to improve my own understanding of what is at stake in the problem or pseudo-problem of "Stolen Photo."  I hope none of those who have offered objections to the previous argument will be annoyed when I repeat the same errors here.

Value is often a function of morality.  The "Stolen Photo" case is a case where value varies inversely with moral status.  Before discussing that case, and its possible implications for consequentialism, consider another case in which value varies positively with moral status. 

(a) I assign value to an act of charity A.  A receives 1 value-point for being such that it helps others, receives 1 point for invariably giving me a warm feeling inside, and receives 1 point just in case it is the right thing to do.  Thus, its total value is equal to 3 in cases where A is the right thing to do, and is equal to 2 in cases where A is the wrong thing to do.

(b) In circumstance C, I have to choose between act of charity A, and act of selfish indulgence B.  If I choose B, the total value which results will be equal to 2.7.  (Suppose this resultant value of B is fixed by factors other than morality, so is not dependent on whether B is right or wrong.)

(c) According to consequentialism, I ought to maximize value.  (Assume, for present purposes, that to "maximize value" is to maximize my own value assignments.)  Suppose consequentialism is the correct moral theory.

(d) If A is right, then A results in a total value of 3.  In that case, A is right according to consequentialism, since the alternative course of action produces only 2.7 units of value.  If A is wrong, then A results in a total value of 2.  In that case, A is wrong according to consequentialism, since greater value could be produced by pursuing action B.

Is there a problem for consequentialism here?  I don’t think so.  There is nothing contradictory about (d).  (d) may sound weird, but I don’t think (d) is incoherent.  Perhaps the lesson we should learn from (d) is just that consequentialism "underdetermines" rightness — that is, that consequentialism cannot always say whether a given act is right or wrong.  But this is not really a knock against consequentialism.  Many other moral theories are "incomplete" in this way, and need to be supplemented by other considerations in order to produce a determinate result.  There’s no reason to think consequentialism won’t be similar in this regard.

Now consider another case.

a) I assign value to an artwork A.  A receives 1 point for being beautiful, receives 1 point for being fabulous, and receives 1 point for having been produced in an immoral way.  Thus, A’s total value is equal to 3 in cases where A has been produced in an immoral way, and is equal to 2 in cases where A has not been produced in an immoral way.

(b) In circumstance C, I have to choose between financing the production of A, or spending my money on selfish indulgence B instead.  If I choose B, the total value which results will be equal to 2.7.  (Suppose this resultant value of B is fixed by factors other than morality, so is not dependent on whether B is right or wrong.)

(c) According to consequentialism, I ought to maximize value.  (Assume, for present purposes, that to "maximize value" is to maximize my own value assignments.)  Suppose consequentialism is the correct moral theory.

(d) If financing the production of A is right, then financing the production of A results in a total value of 2.  In that case, financing the production of A is wrong according to consequentialism, since the alternative course of action produces 2.7 units of value.  If financing the production of A is wrong, then A results in a total value of 3.  In that case, financing the production of A is right according to consequentialism, since no greater value could be produced by pursuing action B.

I think the consequentialist does need to deny (d).  Assuming that any given action is either right or wrong, (d) results in a contradiction.  If your moral theory results in a contradiction, then it is probably false.  I suppose the best thing for the consequentialist to do, in this case, is to deny that (a) is possible; (b) and (c) seem clearly possible.  I, for one, don’t see any reason to think that (a) is impossible.  However, the consequentialist does seem clearly committed to denying the possibility of (a).  So if nothing else, this argument seems to show that consequentialists are committed to deny that value can increase in inverse proportion with immorality, or at least to deny something along those lines.  For consequentialists who accept desire-satisfaction theories of value, this amounts to the declaration that wrong-doing cannot be a component of anyone’s desires.  But I think this declaration would probably be false.  People do seem to be able to perversely desire that wrong is done.