E.G.

My last post on this topic left some threads hanging.  In this post I’ll try to pick up some of those threads.  Ideally you will have read the previous post before reading this one, but if you’re already familiar with this topic you might not really need to do that.

Recall that, according to Dreier’s Conjecture, there is, for every non-consequentialist theory, a conceivable "counterpart" consequentialist theory which provides the same verdicts in the same circumstances as the "original" non-consequentialist theory.  In the previous post, we saw that even if Dreier’s Conjecture is true, this is not enough to motivate the view that the consequentialism/non-consequentialism distinction is unimportant, insignificant or otherwise "empty."  Among other things, that result requires another thesis, which I will call the Verdict Thesis:

Verdict Thesis: A moral theory M is not importantly distinguishable from another moral theory N if M and N yield the same verdicts in the same circumstances.

The Verdict Thesis is probably false.  It is probably false because, as was noted in the previous post, moral theories do all sorts of important things other than yield verdicts.  But it is probably false for another reason, as well. 

Let’s say that a theory is remotely plausible if it is such that at least one minimally rational, consistent, well-informed person, who is not utterly morally depraved, could accept it.  Now consider a non-consequentialist theory N1.  Suppose Dreier’s Conjecture is true.  Then there exists a consequentialist counterpart to N1; let’s call it M1.  But suppose N1 is remotely plausible, while M1 is not.  For instance: suppose that you’d have to believe that George Bush has six heads in order to consistently accept M1, whereas to accept N1 you do not need to believe any such wildly false claims.  This fact alone, I would think, permits us to "importantly distinguish" between M1 and N1.  So even though M1 and N1 yield the same verdicts in the same circumstances, we can importantly distinguish between them.  Thus the Verdict Thesis is false.

In the example just discussed, the existence of M1 shows that Dreier’s Conjecture is true, at least for the case of N1.  But I doubt anyone would think, even for a minute, that this means that the consequentialism/non-consequentialism distinction is "empty."  Why would no one think this?  Here’s my suggestion.  For Dreier’s Conjecture to be significantly true, it has to be the case that if you start out with a remotely plausible non-consequentialist theory N, you’d better be able to find a remotely plausible consequentialist "counterpart" theory M.  If all the possible counterparts to N are not even remotely plausible, then even if Dreier’s Conjecture is true, it’s not very interesting that it is true.

So, what is needed is to supplement Dreier’s Conjecture so as to accommodate this "remote plausibility of the counterpart" requirement.  To meet this need, I suggest we consider "P-Dreier’s Conjecture": 

P-Dreier’s Conjecture: For any remotely plausible non-consequentialist theory N, there exists a remotely plausible "counterpart" consequentialist theory M which yields the same verdicts in the same circumstances as the original.

If we can show that P-Dreier’s Conjecture is true, then at least we’ll have the beginnings of a case for the view that the consequentialism/non-consequentialism distinction is empty. 

Unfortunately for those (such as myself) who want the consequentialism/non-consequentialism distinction not to be empty, it appears that P-Dreier’s Conjecture is true.  In Dreier’s original paper on this topic you can find evidence for that view, although as I recall Dreier himself does not seem to notice that some notion like that of plausibility should figure into his case.  I won’t provide a case for P-Dreier’s Conjecture here.  But consider this: Most remotely plausible non-consequentialist theories take account of the "intrinsic" features of a given action as reasons for prohibiting or prescribing that action.  As Dreier and others have shown, it is usually not hard to incorporate those features into a coherent theory of value, and thereby to produce a "counterpart" consequentialist theory.  Moreover, it seems usually to be the case that when those features are so incorporated, they yield a theory of value which is intuitively plausible for the same reasons that the original, non-consequentialist theory was plausible.  This should mean that if you start out with a remotely plausible non-consequentialist theory N, you can use it as a guide to produce a remotely plausible theory of value, and thereby to produce a remotely plausible consequentialist theory M.   So, I tentatively suggest that P-Dreier’s Conjecture is true.

In passing, it should be noted that we use this notion of "remote plausibility" to modify the Verdict Thesis, like so:

P-Verdict Thesis: A moral theory M is not importantly distinguishable from another moral theory N if (a) M and N yield the same verdicts in the same circumstances, and (b) If N is remotely plausible, then M is remotely plausible.

It might be thought that if we combine P-Dreier’s Conjecture with the P-Verdict Thesis, we will have a pretty good case for the view that the consequentialism/non-consequentialism distinction is empty.  But I want to show that that is not the case.

Recall the discussion in my previous post.  There, it was suggested that Dreier’s Conjecture only tells half the story.  Dreier’s Conjecture says that for any non-consequentialist theory there exists a "counterpart" consequentialist theory.  It does not say that for any consequentialist theory there exists a non-consequentialist "counterpart" theory.  Thus what is need, I claimed, is to consider a thesis which I called "Reverse Dreier’s Conjecture":

Reverse Dreier’s Conjecture: For any consequentialist theory M, there exists a "counterpart" non-consequentialist theory N which yields the same verdicts in the same circumstances as the original.

We are now in a position to introduce the notion of "remote plausibility" into Reverse Dreier’s Conjecture to yield

P-Reverse Dreier’s Conjecture: For any remotely plausible consequentialist theory M, there exists a remotely plausible "counterpart" non-consequentialist theory N which yields the same verdicts in the same circumstances as the original.

I claim that if we combine P-Dreier’s Conjecture, the P-Verdict Thesis, and P-Reverse Dreier’s Conjecture, we have a very good argument for the view that the non-consequentialism/consequentialism distinction is empty.  To put this point a little differently, lay your eyes on the following:

1. P-Dreier’s Conjecture is true.
2. The P-Verdict Thesis is true.
3. P-Reverse Dreier’s Conjecture is true.

I think that if 1-3 are accepted, then one can provide a very strong argument for the view that

4. The consequentialism/non-consequentialism distinction is empty.

One might take issue with premise 2.  I am not interested in doing that; as was mentioned previously, others (e.g. Doug Portmore) have given good reasons to reject 2.  I will here offer a case against 3.

To do this, what we need is to find a remotely plausible consequentialist theory for which no remotely plausible "counterpart" non-consequentialist theory exists.  This would provide a clear counterexample to P-Reverse Dreier’s Conjecture.  This, in turn, would show that premise 3 is false, and therefore that at least the argument we’re considering just now can’t be used to show that the consequentialism/non-consequentialism distinction is empty.

To get at the counterexample to P-Reverse Dreier’s Conjecture which I have in mind, consider the following scenario.  Suppose, back in 1937 (or whenever), Hitler is faced with a choice: (A) To carry out the holocaust, resulting in the deaths of millions of innocent people; or (B) not to carry out the holocaust, sparing millions of innocent people.  (Probably, Hitler never really was faced with a singular moment of choice like this; the holocaust was probably the result of thousands of comparatively smaller decisions on his part, as well as on the parts of others.  But for the purpose of this scenario, assume there was just one moment of choice.)  We should and would say: Hitler ought to have made choice (B) — and it was terribly wrong to make choice (A).

Now suppose that whether Hitler chooses (A) or (B) will have effects for the next thousand years.  That is, suppose that the world in the year 2937 would be different if Hitler chose (A) than it would be if Hitler chose (B).  And suppose that, by means of some extremely complicated causal interconnections, the amount of pleasure experienced between 1937 and 2937 would be slightly higher if Hitler chooses to do (A) than if Hitler chooses to do (B).

Given this information, most people will still say that Hitler ought to choose to do (B).  But I’m guessing you can see where I’m going with this.  Given this supposition about the long-term effects of choosing between (A) and (B), at least some versions of hedonic utilitarianism are committed to the view that Hitler ought to choose (A).  Such versions say, for instance, that the only thing of value is the quantity of pleasure; it does not matter who experiences the pleasure, or why, or when.  And our obligations are simply to choose those actions which, over time, maximize the total amount of that one thing of value.  Since choosing to carry out the holocaust would, over the course of one thousand years, result in the experience of a (very slightly) greater amount of pleasure than not choosing to do so, Hitler ought to have carried out the holocaust.

Of course, most real hedonic utilitarians will probably try to get out of this result.  They might try to show, for instance, that the scenario I’m envisioning could never happen.  But at least some hedonic utilitarians will "bite the bullet" and say that, if we suppose, contrary to fact, that the holocaust would have produced a very slightly greater amount of value than otherwise, then carrying out the holocaust was the right thing to do.

Now, I don’t think this is a plausible verdict.  That is, I think that in the scenario just described, Hitler still ought not have carried out the holocaust.  I suppose most reasonable people would agree with me.  But some hedonic utilitarians, in fact, have endorsed the view that it is right to carry out actions like Hitler’s if such actions produce a slightly greater amount of pleasure.  I’ll go out on a limb and venture the guess that the Ethical Werewolf would accept this verdict; I seem to recall him once saying he would accept a similarly counterintuitive verdict.  (Apologies, of course, to the Werewolf if I am here misrepresenting his views.)  Since at least some smart, minimally well-informed, relatively self-consistent, non-depraved people have endorsed the view that pleasure is the only thing of value, and that one ought always to maximize value, even when doing so means committing atrocities, this view is not completely absurd.  In other words: I think this version of hedonic utilitarianism just described is remotely plausible, even though it is, for most people, a deeply counterintuitive position. 

So we have in hand a consequentialist theory which is remotely plausible and which yields the verdict that in the imagined scenario, Hitler ought to have carried out the holocaust.  We can easily produce a non-consequentialist theory which yields the same verdict.  But I claim we cannot produce a remotely plausible non-consequentialist theory which yields the same verdict.

My claim: In the imagined scenario, the only consideration which could remotely plausibly support the verdict that Hitler ought to have carried out the holocaust is the consideration to which the hedonic utilitarian points: the consideration, that is, that over a very long period of time, the holocaust maximizes pleasure.  I claim that no remotely plausible moral theory could support the hedonic utilitarian’s verdict without being based solely upon that singular consideration.  If I am right about this, then hedonic utilitiarianism is the only remotely plausible moral theory which can yield this particular verdict.  If so, then it follows that for at least one remotely plausible consequentialist theory, there does not exist any remotely plausible non-consequentialist counterpart.  And in that case, it follows that P-Reverse Dreier’s Conjecture is false.  Premise 3, therefore, fails.

To conclude, recall the argument described above:

1. P-Dreier’s Conjecture is true.
2. The P-Verdict Thesis is true.
3. P-Reverse Dreier’s Conjecture is true.
—
4. Therefore, the consequentialism/non-consequentialism distinction is empty.

I think this argument, if expanded, would work if one could gain assent to premises 1-3.  But others have given reason to think that premise 2 is false.  And the Hitler/holocaust case just described gives very good reasons to think premise 3 is false.  So the conclusion cannot be derived by means of the three premises above.  This is not to say that the conclusion cannot be derived by some other means.  But until those other means are proposed and defended, I think we should go on behaving as though the consequentialism/non-consequentialism distinction is non-empty.