E.G.

In my previous post on this topic, it was noted that there are ways in which libertarianism neglects pressing concerns about human well-being.  We saw that this fact forms the basis of a powerful criticism of libertarianism.  The goal of this series of posts is to supplement libertarianism in such a way that it can answer some of these criticisms.  (It was granted in the previous post that we will be unlikely to find a way to answer all of them.)  But our task is to provide the needed supplement without "breaking" libertarianism — that is, without in the process abandoning either libertarianism or the ideas which make libertarianism appealing (to some) in the first place.   

In this post, I will lay some groundwork for this effort by trying to clarify the "libertarian principle" mentioned in the last post.  As it stood in the previous post, the "libertarian principle" has it that "persons have an absolute right to dispose of themselves and the fruits of their labor however they please."  This formulation is inadequate.  Any real, live libertarian would want to deny that I have a right to use my property ["property" being an umbrella term I’ll use to denote "oneself and the fruits of one’s labor"] to destroy or damage the property of others — even if this is how I "please" to dispose of my property.  But as it stands, the libertarian principle appears to allow me to do this.  So, in the following post, I will try to reformulate the libertarian principle in such a way that it can render verdicts more obviously consistent with the verdicts real, live libertarians would give.

First of all, consider the following proposed reformulation of the libertarian principle:

LP1: Persons have an absolute right to dispose of themselves and the fruits of their labor however they please, unless in doing so they infringe upon the same right(s) of other(s).

I think a formulation along these lines is or has been in fairly wide use among libertarian, "classical liberal," and otherwise libertarian-esque writers.  I’ll refrain from identifying any famous culprits here, but invite others to do so in comments, if they so desire. 

LP1 exhibits a reflexivity which makes LP1 equivalent to the following "expanded" formulation:

LP1.1: Persons have an absolute right to dispose of themselves and the fruits of their labor however they please, unless in doing so they do infringe upon the right of (other) persons to dispose of themselves and the fruits of their labor however they please, unless in doing so they do infringe upon the same right of (still other) persons to dispose of…etc.

A full version of LP1.1 (i.e., a version which does not end in an "etc.") will be indefinitely long.  I think this spells doom for LP1.1 (and therefore doom as well to its equivalent LP1).  To illustrate why, consider the following scenario: 

Two people, Bill and Sylvia, are stranded on a deserted island.  Sylvia has made a fishing line from vines she found on the island.  Bill wants to use his club to knock Sylvia over the head and steal Sylvia’s fishing line. 

May Bill clobber Sylvia?  I claim that LP1 cannot provide an answer to this question. Bill wants to clobber Sylvia with his club; that is what he pleases to do with his property.  Sylvia wants not to be clobbered, and to retain possession of her fishing line; that is what she pleases to do with her property.  LP1 says that Bill may do what he pleases with his property unless doing so infringes upon Sylvia’s right to do what she pleases with her property unless doing so infringes upon Bill’s right to do what he pleases with his property, etc.  So LP1 says that Bill may clobber Sylivia with his club unless doing so infringes upon Sylvia’s right to retain possession of her fishing line unless doing so infringes upon Bill’s right to clobber Sylvia with his club unless…etc.  This succession of "unless" clauses will never end; but without an end, LP1 cannot provide us an answer to our question. 

We already know the right answer: Bill may not clobber Sylvia.  But LP1’s reflexivity precludes its providing us that answer.  Indeed, I claim that LP1 is not capable of providing any answer at all, not even the wrong one.  The reflexivity present in LP1, then, according to me, makes LP1 hollow. 

In light of LP1’s hollowness, let us turn away from it, and attend to the second formulation of the libertarian principle I want to consider:

LP2: Persons have an absolute right to dispose of themselves and the fruits of their labor however they please, so long as in doing so they do not initiate the use of force against others.

(Once again, I’ll refrain from dropping the names of famous advocates of LP2-like formulations, but invite others to do so in comments.)

I think LP2 is better than LP1, since unlike LP1, LP2 is capable of actually providing verdicts in cases.  For instance, in the case of Bill and Sylvia, LP2’s verdict, I take it, would be: Bill may not clobber Sylvia, since in doing so he would initiate the use of force against Sylvia.  But Sylvia may go on retaining possession of her fishing line, since in doing so no force against Bill is initiated.  Moreover, if Bill does decide to clobber Sylvia, Sylvia may retaliate with force — since in doing so she would not initiate the use of force against Bill.

The ability of LP2 not to devolve into a chaos of self reference is a decided advantage.  But the problem with LP2, I think, is that LP2 inappropriately relies upon us to say what "force" is, and relies on us to characterize the circumstances in which force is "initiated."  But I expect there to be wide disagreement about both these issues.  Does a con artist, for instance, use force when she swindles someone?  If not, do the police initiate the use of force when they apprehend the con artist?  I expect there to be various and conflicting answers to these questions.  It would be nice if our formulation of the libertarian principle did not incite such confusion. 

I think the confusion caused by the term "force" in LP2 is enough to motivate consideration of alternative formulations.  So consider the following one:

LP3: Persons have an absolute right to dispose of their property however they please — within their property.

I like LP3; LP3 is the formulation I favor.  Here I’ll give only two reasons for favoring LP3:

(1) What verdict would LP3 render in the case of Bill and Sylvia?  Were Bill to clobber Sylvia, Bill’s club would cross the boundary between Bill’s property and Sylvia’s property.  In clobbering Sylvia, Bill would not be disposing of his property within his property — and so LP3 would prohibit that action.  This is the verdict we want.  Thus, if we confine our attention to the case of Bill and Sylvia, LP3 is better than LP1 and at least as good as LP2.

(2) Unlike LP2, LP3 does not require us to specify a problematic and potentially contentious notion of "force."  In fact, the addition of "…within their property" to the original formulation of the libertarian principle does not introduce any new terminology at all.  So, it seems to me, if the original formulation contains adequately comprehensible terms, then so should LP3.  As we have seen, the same cannot be said for LP2.

These are two reasons to prefer LP3 over LP1 and LP2.  I think there are other considerations which count in favor of LP3.  Any formulation of the libertarian principle should be able to render verdicts in particular cases with which one would expect libertarians to agree.  Though I will not present a full argument for this point here, I believe LP3 does this quite well.  Thus, for present purposes at least, I propose we adopt LP3 as our "working model" of the central principle of libertarianism.

LP3, then, will be the "libertarian principle" with which I will work in subsequent posts.  In the next post, I will try to provide a "supplement" to the libertarian principle which can (a) enable libertarianism to answer some objections from considerations about human well-being without (b) "breaking" libertarianism.